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ABSTRACT 
On 11 June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council endorsed the ‘Guiding 
Principles for Business and Human Rights’ as a new set of guiding principles for global 
business designed to provide a global standard for preventing and addressing the risk of 
adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activity. This outcome was preceded 
by an earlier unsuccessful attempt by a Sub-Commission of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights to win approval for a set of binding corporate human rights norms, the 
so called “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”. This article identifies and 
discusses the reasons why the Norms eventually failed to win approval by the then UN 
Commission on Human Rights. This discussion is important in order to understand the 
difficulties in establishing binding ‘hard law’ obligations for Transnational 
Corporations with regard to human rights within the wider framework of international 
law. It is crucial to understand possible motives as well as the underlying rationale 
which lead first to the adoption and then the rapid abandoning of the Norms: such a 
discussion will also shed light on the prospects and trends of concepts of indirect, vague 
voluntarism of business human rights compliance, as well as on prospects of finding 
alternative solutions, and finally the rationale and effect of the ‘Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights’. 
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1 Introduction and overview 
After endorsing the 2011 ‘Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights’,1 the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a press release 
announcing that “[i]n an unprecedented step, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council has endorsed a new set of Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights 
designed to provide - for the first time - [italics added] a global standard for 
preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to 
business activity.”2 While such a categorization may be debatable,3 there remains little 
disagreement over the importance of such endorsement by the UN Human Rights 
Council. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human 
Rights, Professor Ruggie, stated that “[t]he Council’s endorsement establishes the 
Guiding Principles as the authoritative global reference point for business and human 
rights”.4 This was reinforced by the incorporation of the Guiding Principles and the 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework in the 2011 update of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.5 However, in order to fully understand the 
importance as well as the novelty of the framework, it is imperative to understand the 
drafting history leading to this seminal outcome of corporate human rights and 
particularly the initiative which was the basis for the establishment of the mandate of 
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.6   
                                                           
1
 These are the guiding principles for States and transnational corporations and other business entities 
on the implementation of Ruggie’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework. 
2
 UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NEW GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ENDORSED BY THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights) (2011), http://www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-endorsed-16-jun-2011.pdf (last 
visited Sep 13, 2011); for the full text of the Guiding Principles, see UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY- GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, JOHN RUGGIE 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS 
“PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK (2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf (last visited Jul 12, 2011); UN 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/un-human-
rights-council-resolution-re-human-rights-transnational-corps-eng-6-jul-2011.pdf (last visited Sep 13, 
2011) 
3
 See infra Section 2 for a discussion on previous standards of business and human rights relations. 
4
 UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
5
 OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES - 2011 UPDATE IV, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Aug 17, 2011) 
6
 John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 THE 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 819-840, 821 (2007) 
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 In 1998 the Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of 
Transnational Corporations was established by a Sub-Commission of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.7 Its mandate was to make recommendations and 
proposals to the working methods and activities of transnational corporations (TNCs), 
in order to ensure that these correlate with the economic and social objectives of their 
host countries and are promoting human rights.8 The final detailed document and its 
commentary were approved in August 2003 by the Sub-Commission. The document 
was named the ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (hereinafter Norms).9 The 
Norms were of a far-reaching character that included a duty laid on TNCs10 to impose 
                                                           
7
 The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
OF THE 21ST CENTURY 251-262, 251–252; Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized 
World, 25 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 273-322, 284 (2002) 
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was renamed in 
1999 to be named the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. SUB-
COMMISSION ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS - 58TH SESSION, GENEVA (7 - 25 
AUGUST 2006), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/subcom/index.htm (last visited Jul 6, 2011) 
8
 SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ENJOYMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE 
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND THE WORKING METHODS AND ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 4 (d) (1998), http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/SUBCOM/resolutions/E-CN_4-SUB_2-
RES-1998-8.doc (last visited Jul 22, 2011) During the subsequent years, the mandate of the working 
group was expanded several times. In 2001 the mandate was extended for another three years, and the 
authority to compile a list of human rights instruments and norms pertaining to transnational 
corporations was included. SUB-COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EFFECTS OF THE WORKING 
METHODS AND ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL (2001), 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/SUBCOM/resolutions/E-CN_4-SUB_2-RES-2001-3.doc (last visited 
Jul 22, 2011) 
9
 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) UN ESCOR, NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2003), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En?Opendocum
ent (last visited Mar 2, 2009); Carolin F. Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 10 
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1065-1080, 1071 (2003); David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, Norms on the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human 
rights, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 901-922, 901–915 (2003); Larry Catá Backer, 
Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations as Harbinger of Corporate Responsibility in International Law, 37 
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 287-389, 287 (2006); Ruggie at 820; David Kinley & Rachel 
Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 447-497, 467–468 (2006); Olga Martin-Ortega, 
Business and Human Rights in Conflict, 22 ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 273-283, 280–281 
(2008); Troy Rule, Using Norms to Change International Law: UN Human Rights Laws Sneaking in 
through the Back Door, 5 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 325, 328 (2004) 
10
 Although the Norms apply to TNCs and other business enterprises, for reasons of parsimony and 
being concise, the term TNCs in this chapter relates also to other business enterprises, unless it is 
expressly stated otherwise.  
 4 
 
human rights obligations upon States, even if States failed to ratify the human rights 
instruments establishing these duties.11  
 The draft document of the Norms represented a significant departure from the 
prevailing trend among international organisations when dealing with the often 
difficult relationship between business and human rights: that of voluntary 
compliance.12 The Norms were designed to constitute a ‘non-voluntary’, 
comprehensive framework, creating direct obligations for TNCs and supplemented by 
a rigid enforcement mechanism including the monitoring by non-State actors (NGOs 
and TNCs themselves). The document was prepared in accordance with the mandate 
that the Working Group received and was in line with the background reports upon 
which it was supposed to structure its work. Many scholars have hailed the document 
for being the path breaking initiative that might, for the first time, succeed in ending 
corporate abuses of human rights.13  
This explicit support of the Norms was contradicted by the often fierce 
opposition from various States and from the majority of the business community 
which greeted the Norms at their formal introduction as discussion paper after their 
                                                           
11
 Backer at 371–380; Ruggie at 825–826; Kinley & Chambers at 452 
12
 Such approaches were prevalent within the UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, SERVICES AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 231–
243 (United Nations) (1990), http://unctc.unctad.org/data/e90iia11a.pdf (last visited Sep 13, 2011) see 
particularly art. 4); the International Labour Organisation in the Tripartite Declaration (LXI 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977), http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-
english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/triparti.htm (last visited Aug 24, 2011); LXXXIII INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (2000), 
http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_101234/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Aug 24, 
2011); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (2006), 
http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Aug 24, 
2011)); as well as in the OECD in its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (The OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 89-106, 98–106; OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited Aug 17, 2011); 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development)  
13
 See Surya Deva, UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction, 10 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & 
COMPARATIVE LAW 493-524, 497 (2004); Julie Campagna, United Nations Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global Rule Makers, 37 JOHN 
MARSHALL LAW REVIEW 1205-1252 (2004); Hillemanns at 1065; Weissbrodt & Kruger; David 
Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 55-74, 55 
(2005) 
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approval by the Sub-Commission.14 Most States expressed strong reservations 
emphasising their desire not to depart from the traditional framework of international 
law, which stresses the central and pivotal role of the State as legal subject of public 
international law. The Norms were eventually abandoned in 2005 and the task of 
regulating transnational corporate accountability was transferred to other UN 
organs.15 
This article discusses possible reasons for why the Norms failed to win 
approval by the UN Commission on Human Rights. This discussion is necessary for 
us to understand the difficulties in installing ‘hard law’ governing obligations of 
TNCs with regard to human rights within the wider framework of international law. It 
is crucial to understand possible motives as well as the underlying rationale which 
lead first to the adoption and then the rapid abandoning of the Norms: such a process 
will also shed light on the prospects and trends of concepts of indirect, vague 
voluntarism, as well as on prospects of finding alternative solutions. 
Ruggie’s legislative initiative was defined by one of its drafters as a “non-
voluntary set of norms binding upon corporations”.16 Deva sees the importance of the 
Norms in the observation that they constitute a shift in paradigms “that have to date 
dominated the discourse of corporate social responsibility” and have caused 
ineffective regulation of corporate conduct resulting in abuses of human rights.17 The 
Norms were defined by its authors, largely as a restatement of existing obligations of 
TNCs in respect to human rights under international law. However, some of the 
                                                           
14
 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) UN ESCOR 
15
 The Commission decided that the Norms contained “useful elements and ideas” but added that it had 
not requested it and that, as a draft proposal, it had no legal standing. The determination of several 
major industrialized countries to deal with the relation between business and human rights ultimately 
resulted in the appointment of Ruggie to the post of a special representative to the UN Secretary 
General, although with a significantly narrower mandate. Backer at 288,331–333; Ruggie at 821; 
Kinley & Chambers at 449; Martin-Ortega at 281 
16
 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) UN ESCOR; Hillemanns at 1071; Weissbrodt & 
Kruger at 901–915; Backer at 287; Ruggie at 820; Kinley & Chambers at 467–468; Martin-Ortega at 
280–281; Rule at 328 
17
 Deva at 497; Hillemanns at 1068 On the movement of corporate social responsibility and its 
development see Ronen Shamir, Capitalism, Governance, and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 6 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 531-553 (2010); David Vogel, 
Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 261-282 (2008) 
 6 
 
obligations in the Norms were a teleological manifestation of an ongoing “progressive 
development” of the existing principles of international law.18 
Perhaps, their main novelty, and possibly the main reason for the subsequent 
controversy over the Norms, was the fact that the obligations were to be imposed 
directly on TNCs rather than requesting or requiring States to implement legislation to 
regulate the actions of the TNCs within their jurisdiction. While most of the rules in 
the Norms represent already recognized obligations, within the existing frameworks of 
international law, in the vast majority of cases, they are imposed indirectly on TNCs, 
through the intermediary of the States.19 Baxi further argues that the Norms reflect 
duties that apply to States and may not be automatically transposed to apply to TNCs. 
In that respect he believes that while the Norms may be a good vision of de lege 
ferenda, or the aspired law, they do not reflect lex lata, or positive existing law.20 
This article identifies three reasons which most likely may have led to the 
eventual abandoning of the draft Norms by the UN Commission on Human Rights: 
Firstly, the fact that a large part of the Norms constituted a further development of 
existing international norms, rather than actual codification of existing international 
law, enabled critics of the Norms to argue their incompatibility as legal analogies to 
otherwise positivist foundations of international law. Secondly, the fact that the 
Norms assigned an important legal role to TNCs (MNCs respectively) as direct 
addressees and not the States as the traditional addressees of international law blurred 
the distinction between international public and private legal frameworks, and thus 
undermined the central role of states as international law subjects. Finally, inherent 
contradictions within the Norms themselves and an overall vagueness in their overall 
nature and applicability helped to foster opposition against their adoption. 
                                                           
18
 Weissbrodt & Kruger at 913–915; Carlos M Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of 
Corporations under International Law, 43 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 927-960, 
928 (2005); Rule at 326; Hillemanns at 1070 
19
 Examples of such documents and treaties are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, and the OECD and UN anti-bribery conventions. See JOHN GERARD 
RUGGIE, INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE 
ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 
U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006) 61 (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises) (2006), 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/RuggieReport2006.html (last visited Oct 18, 2011); Ruggie at 
822; Kinley & Chambers at 460; Vazquez at 929–930 
20
 Upendra Baxi, Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights, 5 HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 1 -26, 14 (2005) 
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This article will first examine the reasons that led to the formal recognition of the 
existence for the need to create the Norms, secondly comment on the drafting process 
of the Norms with a focus on the stakeholder environment at the time of this process. 
The third part reviews the main features and novelties introduced in the draft 
document.21 Finally, the paper will analyse the responses to the Norms, through 
examining their legal validity and justifications. 
2 Legislative context and relevance of the Norms 
The Norms’ aimed at “maximizing the good that companies do while 
eliminating the abuses they commit“.22 Their rationale was to establish (and enforce) a 
balance between corporate business behaviour and human rights, which acknowledges 
the positive role corporations can play in regard to economic development and overall 
prosperity,23 while preventing the occurrence of corporate human rights violations. 
One of its drafters, Professor Weissbrodt argues that grave human rights abuses by 
corporations occur in a variety of business situations and consequently need to be 
regulated at the supranational level.24 
As pointed out by Kinley and Chambers, the 1990ies saw widening concerns in 
respect to increased violations of human rights by TNCs before the background of an 
increased liberalisation of international trade rules, the increase of foreign direct 
investment in developing and emerging economies as well as the growing power and 
influence of MNCs and TNCs.25 The US scholar Blumberg (2002) describes the 
impact of such MNC/MNEs on global trade and business:  
 
“In the modern global economy, the largest corporations conduct 
worldwide operations. They operate in the form of multinational 
corporate groups organized in “incredibly complex” multi-tiered 
corporate structures consisting of a dominant parent corporation, sub 
holding companies, and scores or hundreds of subservient subsidiaries 
                                                           
21
 This review is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of the various norms listed in the document. 
For a comprehensive analysis of the various norms in the document, see Hillemanns; Backer; Deva; 
Baxi; Campagna; Weissbrodt & Kruger; Weissbrodt 
22
 Weissbrodt at 58 
23
 William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 HUMAN 
RIGHTS QUARTERLY 368-397, 368–397 (1996) 
24
 Weissbrodt at 56–58 
25
 Kinley & Chambers at 457 
 8 
 
scattered around the world. The 1999 World Investment Report 
estimated that there are almost 60,000 multinational corporate groups 
with more than 500,000 foreign subsidiaries and affiliates”26   
The possibility of MNCs’ indirect liability for human rights violations as aider and 
abettor was recognized by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights (hereinafter Sub-Commission) which voiced “significant concerns 
about the conduct of transnational corporations and other businesses”.27  
Weissbrodt follows the traditional notion whereas international law in general 
and international human rights law (IHRL) in particular, focuses on protecting the 
individual from violations by governments. He also believes that while new groups of 
non-State actors, are being subjected by various sub-fields of international law, TNCs 
and businesses in general remained largely unaffected by these developments.28 While 
some international legal documents may be interpreted as applying to corporations, 
most of them applied to the TNCs only indirectly.29 However, such indirect regulation 
did not prevent abuses of human rights by businesses and therefore several 
international efforts to create frameworks of direct obligations on TNCs were made. 
These attempts include the unsuccessful attempts to establish a UN Code of Conduct 
for Transnational Corporations, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
                                                           
26
 Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights against Multinational Corporations under United 
States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW 493-529, 493 (2002); Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Human rights and global business: the 
evolving notion of corporate civil responsibility, INDIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLICY 193-220 (2009) 
27
 Weissbrodt at 64 
28
 Such sub fields of international law include individual responsibility in the international criminal 
tribunals and the ICC, armed opposition groups in international humanitarian law (IHL), terrorists and 
traffickers in human beings in international criminal law (ICL). See Id. at 59–60; SUBMISSION OF 
CANADA TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS 2.2, 3.3–3.4, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/canada.doc (last visited Jul 20, 
2011); but see S. R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE LAW JOURNAL 443-545, 377–388 (2001) 
29
 Among such documents one can recall the OECD Guidelines, ILO’s Tripartite Declaration, the 
Convention on Combating Bribery, as well as the Warsaw Convention. Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development; LXI INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION; INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1969), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm (last visited Sep 13, 2011); CONVENTION FOR THE 
UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR (1929), 
http://www.dot.gov/ost/ogc/Warsaw1929.pdf (last visited Sep 13, 2011) Generally see Vazquez; but 
see David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights responsibilities 
for corporations at international law, 44 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 931-1023, 946–
947 (2004) 
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the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
the Global Compact initiative.30 The new Norms seemed to remedy this lack of 
accountability: scholars were referring to the adoption of the Norms, after their final 
drafting and their eventual disappearance from the agenda of the UN, as one of the 
“most promising human rights norms for TNCs to date”.31 The German government 
described the Norms as a “useful contribution to the ongoing debate on ways and 
means of integrating business enterprises in the international endeavours to promote 
and protect human rights and sustainable development”32 The drafting initiative was 
supported by many NGOs.33 Furthermore, several transnational businesses, which 
participated in the “Initiative for Respect” and the “Ethical Globalisation Initiative”, 
volunteered to participate in the “pilot project” for the Norms, as part of their wider 
commitment to human rights.34 
The Norms drew heavily from existing human rights documents35 and it seems 
that their overall aim was to fill a void in the existing frameworks of international law, 
by providing a single, comprehensive and constituting set of human rights norms with 
binding effect for all corporations. They were designed to serve as an accessible legal 
                                                           
30
 UNCTC at 231–243; LXI INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION; Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development; Weissbrodt & Kruger at 903; PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 474–476 (Oxford University Press Second Edition) (2007); Kinley & 
Chambers at 455–456; Ratner at 454–459; Ruggie at 819; Campagna at 1206–1207; John Gerard 
Ruggie, Global-governance.net: The Global Compact as Learning Network, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
371-378 (2001); John Gerard Ruggie, The Theory and Practice of Learning Networks: Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the Global Compact, 5 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 27-36 (2002); 
UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited Sep 13, 2011) 
31
 See Deva at 497; Campagna; Hillemanns at 1065; Weissbrodt & Kruger; Weissbrodt at 55 
32
 GERMAN RESPONSE TO OHCHR NOTES VERBALE OF 19 MAY 2004 AND 22 JULY 2004 REGARDING 
CHR DECISION 2004/116—RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND RELATED 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/germany.pdf (last visited Jul 12, 
2011) 
33
 The list of NGOs supporting the initative included Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Oxfam, and the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum. See Weissbrodt & Kruger at 
906 
34
 These businesses were: ABB, Barclays Bank, National Grid Transco, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, MTV 
and The Body Shop International, Gap Inc., Hewlett-Packard, Statoil. Id. at 907; Kinley & Chambers at 
461; Weissbrodt at 72–73 
35
 Many existing human rights documents are mentioned in the Preamble to the Norms, inter alia the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; the Slavery Convention and the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See the full list at U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) UN ESCOR at 3–7. See also Kinley & Chambers at 451; Rule at 
333. 
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document which could be applied even by non experts of IHRL, particularly corporate 
directors. Deva further explains that the need to draft the Norms as a separate 
document, relying on other conventions and applying them to TNCs, is in fact an 
evidence of the presence of certain gaps in the existing legal framework.36 On the 
other hand, one must question whether this need truly existed or were the Norms yet 
another redundant document. Campagna observes that the fact that the envisaged duty 
of TNCs to ‘respect, protect and ensure human rights’ worldwide, under the 
framework of the Norms, constituted a formal recognition of legal principles of 
international human rights law as evolved since World War II and particularly since 
the end of the Cold War.37 
3 Drafting History 
The Norms were not the first attempt to regulate the connection between business and 
human rights.38 They were preceded by a number of initiatives within the legal 
framework of the OECD and UN.39 However, these ‘soft law’ ‘CSR’ styled initiatives 
did not seem to be sufficient to eliminate corporate abuses of human rights at a grand 
scale. In 1998 a Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of 
Transnational Corporations was established by the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.40 The Sub-Commission 
itself was created by ECOSOC in 1947 as a think-tank for the UN Commission on 
Human Rights.41 Its mandate is to study cases of human rights violations, to examine 
obstacles to human rights protection and develop new international standards.42 The 
Working Group was made up of five members, who participated in its work as 
independent experts.43 The Sub-Commission mandated the Working Group in 
Resolution 1998/8 inter alia  
“to make recommendations and proposals relating to the methods of 
work and activities of transnational corporations in order to ensure that 
                                                           
36
 Deva at 499 
37
 Campagna at 1222 
38
 Kinley & Chambers at 455 
39
 See supra note 19 and the accompanying text thereto. 
40
 Ragnwaldh & Konopik at 251–252 
41
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 Kinley & Chambers at 456 
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such methods and activities are in keeping with the economic and 
social objectives of the countries in which they operate, and to promote 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to 
development, as well as of civil and political rights”.44  
The Working Group drew from prior work which was based on three background 
reports.45 The first report of 1995 elaborated on the economic environment conditions, 
presenting how the global strategies of the TNCs were having an adverse effect on the 
promotion of human rights, particularly international labour and trade union rights, by 
emphasising the gradual shift of power from States to TNCs: “[t]he activities and 
methods of work of TNCs have implications for the effective enjoyment of a number 
of human rights”.46  
A second report of 1996, focused on the possibilities of subjecting a 
corporation as a whole to a single jurisdiction. It particularly noted that while each 
subsidiary can in principle be subject to the national regulation of its host country, 
                                                           
44
 SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES at 4(d) 
During the subsequent years, the mandate of the Working Group was expanded several times. When 
the mandate was further extended in 2001, the Sub-Commission’s Resolution 2001/3 provided more 
detail on the expected outcome of the Working Group in paragraph 4. “(b) Compile a list of the various 
relevant instruments and norms concerning human rights and international cooperation that are 
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sanctions and obtain compensation for infringements committed and damage caused by transnational 
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HUMAN RIGHTS; Weissbrodt & Kruger at 904–905; Kinley & Chambers at 463 
45
 Backer at 322; SUB-COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF 
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HUMAN RIGHTS, IN PARTICULAR, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS, AND THE 
WORKING METHODS AND ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1995), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G95/130/59/PDF/G9513059.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Jul 6, 2011); 
SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, THE IMPACT 
OF THE ACTIVITIES AND WORKING METHODS OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE FULL 
ENJOYMENT OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, IN PARTICULAR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND 
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, BEARING IN MIND EXISTING INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, RULES AND 
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER (1996), 
http://shr.aaas.org/article15/Reference_Materials/E_CN.4_Sub.2_1996_12_Eng.pdf (last visited Jul 6, 
2011); SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, 
WORKING DOCUMENT ON THE IMPACT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE 
REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, PREPARED BY MR. EL HADJI GUISSÉ, 
PURSUANT TO SUBCOMMISSION RESOLUTION 1997/11 (1998), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G98/128/35/PDF/G9812835.pdf (last visited Jul 6, 2011) 
46
 SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES; Backer 
further argues that the report goes further and essentially defines the State as “any amalgamation of 
power that can assert the power normally exercised by, or otherwise coerce entities that are recognized 
as states.” In accordance with this analysis, the TNCs are to be treated on a level similar to States and 
should therefore have some of the responsibilities according to their role. Backer at 322–323  
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there is no single national regulation, which the entire TNC is subject to, as “[t]he 
global reach of TNCs is not matched by a coherent global system of accountability.”47 
Backer also identifies the focus on positive social role of corporations as a novelty of 
this report.48  
Of particular importance was the third report by El-Hadji Guissé in 1997. 
According to Backer, El-Hadji Guissé’s work with and through the Working Group 
provided the foundations and perspectives for what eventually became the Norms. 
The report presented as a thesis that TNCs were ‘vehicles’ in the transfer of wealth 
away from the poor to the rich, which in fact represents a market failure in need of 
fundamental correction. The report claimed that while the raison d’etre of the TNCs 
is to make profit, this is not enough for the system of values on which our existence is 
based. Therefore, the report emphasised the importance of regulating and restraining 
the actions of TNCs through national regulation and international cooperation of 
States.49 One must note, however, that unlike the Norms that followed and deviating 
from the other two background reports, this document concerned solely 
responsibilities and duties of States, to regulate the conduct of TNCs, rather than 
establishing direct responsibilities for TNCs themselves.50 
The process of discussion and drafting was lengthy; with the mandate of the 
working group being renewed and altered several times.51 The Working Group began 
preparing the Norms in August 1999. It held annual public hearings and met in 
Geneva between 2000 and 2003. Selected representatives from business, the unions, 
NGOs, the scholarly community and other interested persons participated in these 
meetings and were involved in the drafting of the document. The various drafts were 
also published on the internet and in the UN publications.52 
The final detailed document and its commentary were introduced and 
approved in August 2003 by the Sub-Commission. The Sub-Commission sent the 
Norms to its parent body, the UN Commission on Human Rights, which was replaced 
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 SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES at 22; 
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 SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES; Backer at 
326–327 
50
 On the direct linkage between international law and TNCs in the Norms see Backer at 374–375 
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by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2006. By an action without a vote, on 
April 22, 2004, the Commission on Human Rights significantly narrowed the original 
objectives and methodologies of the Norms. It recommended that ECOSOC should 
confirm the importance of the question of the responsibilities of transnational 
corporations with regard to human rights; requested that the new Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) compile a report setting out the scope 
and legal status of current initiatives, and standards relating to the responsibility of 
transnational corporations; and to affirm that the Norms have no legal standing, had 
not been requested by the Commission and that the Sub-Commission should not 
perform any monitoring function of the Norms.53 The Commission disseminated the 
document for further commenting, as was recommended by the Sub Commission. 
Between March and September 2004, the Commission received more than ninety such 
comments. The 2004 session of the Commission welcomed the Norms, while noting 
that it had not actually asked for such a document and that as a draft before the 
Commission, the document did not have any legal status on its own.54  
4 Progressive Development, Novelties and Shortfalls 
The Norms were, in many ways, a new standards setting legal document. Although 
reflecting and drawing from already existing human rights obligations, the Norms 
incorporated notions of progressive development and novel conceptions of human 
rights protection. The Norms attempted to establish direct responsibility of TNCs for 
human rights violations, utilising existing frameworks of international law. They 
aimed to establish an explicit duty for TNCs to promote human rights from ‘top to 
bottom’, even in respect to corporations registered in non state parties. These norms 
were designed to constitute a ‘non-voluntary’ framework, which was far more 
codified than any voluntary framework, but fell short of being mandatory remaining 
to constitute ‘soft law’ instead of ‘hard law’. This section will discuss these novelties 
and contradictions. 
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 Kinley & Chambers at 451, 463; Weissbrodt at 64–68; Baxi at 2; One should note, however that 
although the Commission was correct that it did not ask for this document, the Sub-Commission had 
full powers to ask for its drafting as it did. See the Resolutions of the Sub-Commission defining the 
Mandate of the Working Group: SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND 
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES; SUB-COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
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The Preamble of the Norms essentially reiterates the fundamental character of 
Corporate Social Responsibility as a means to promote and protect human rights.55 
The Norms are basically a furtherance of the human rights principles already found in 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948.56 Campagna thinks 
that the legal foundations of the duty of TNCs to promote and protect human rights, as 
defined in the Norms, derive directly from the UDHR.57 As part of the attempt to 
characterise the Norms as a document of mere codification of already established 
principles of customary international law, rather than a progressive development 
thereof, the Preamble contains an open, non-exhaustive list of the sources of 
international treaties and conventions, which establish the legal basis for TNCs 
obligations to human rights, some of which, arguably, even reach the level of jus 
cogens.58 In Baxi’s view, this also raises the problem of intelligibility, as not everyone 
among the stakeholders of corporate human rights protection, certainly among the 
CEOs in the business community, are familiar with the full range of human rights 
instruments referred to in the Norms.59 Consequently, the Preamble of the Norms does 
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not only serve as an introduction to the document, but also explains the core substance 
of the Norms.60  
The operative (main) part of the Norms is divided into seven main categories. 
It presents a comprehensive list of human rights obligations relevant to TNCs. The 
Norms do not set down so called ‘negative’ duties61 (whereas TNCs should refrain 
from violating human rights), but rather introduces as ‘positive’ duties for TNCs the 
duty to promote and ensure respect for human rights,62 and thus supplements the 
traditional, horizontal scale of State ‘sponsored’ human rights protection.  
“General Obligations” in Part A of the Norms list the following 
responsibilities: the duty of due diligence to ensure that business activities do not 
directly or indirectly contribute to human rights abuses; the duty to ensure that 
corporations do not benefit from such abuses; a duty to refrain from undermining 
efforts to promote human rights; to use their influence to promote human rights; the 
obligation to assess their human rights impact; and the overall responsibility to avoid 
complicity in human rights abuses.63 These obligations are significant and impact on 
the “the remainder of the Norms shall be read in light of this paragraph”.64 Article 1 
recognises States as the traditional holders of the primary responsibilities “to promote, 
secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights 
recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights.”65 The 
Norms’ overall impact, however, is more radical: they essentially consign States to the 
background, in scenarios of TNC transnational business responsibilities. TNCs may 
                                                           
60
 Backer at 342–343 substantiates his claim that the Preamble is part of the substantive obligations of 
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even operate against the interest of a State in order to attain the ‘greater, 
internationally-derived good’.66  
The definition of “primary role”, or rather the lack of it, has caused significant 
reservations against such – perceived - demotion in the role of the States. Baxi argues 
that there are several interpretations that may be assigned to the term “primary 
responsibility” which significantly influence the scope of the role of the States and 
their obligations according to this document.67 The United States Council for 
International Business criticised the Norms, for the fact that they “represent a 
fundamental shift in responsibility for protecting human rights – from governments to 
private actors, including companies – effectively privatizing the enforcement of 
human rights laws.”68 This critique is aimed at the key nature of the Norms, as it was 
intended to improve human rights protection in cases where states failed to act, hereby 
widening the scope of applicability of the international human rights law by including 
situations where corporations have larger influence than the States:69 
“[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and influence, 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the 
obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect 
of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as 
national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples 
and other vulnerable groups.”70  
The Commentary on the Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporation, 
clarifies that Norms should apply regardless of where TNCs operate and what the 
level of human rights protection in the respective State is.71 
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The Norms lay down as specific rules and obligations for corporations the right to 
equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment, the right to security of persons, 
rights of workers, respect for national sovereignty and human rights, obligations with 
regard to consumer protection and obligations with regard to environmental 
protection.72  
Of particular interest is part E of the Norms, where the TNCs are identified as 
possible multipliers for the development of a global business society wedded to the 
rule of law, transparency, accountability and sustainable development, in which the 
people’s civil, political, economic and cultural rights are realised. This represents a 
novelty in three main aspects. Firstly, instead of limiting the TNCs’ obligations to 
civil and political rights, it includes both civil and collective social, economic and 
cultural rights of the second and third generations of human rights. Secondly, as 
mentioned above, this applies positive obligations upon TNCs which creates ‘quasi’ 
horizontal status. Thirdly, TNCs are expected to respect and promote even rights of 
those affected only indirectly, invisibly and/or in the longer run from their activities.73 
Part H deals with general provisions of implementation of the Norms.74 Deva 
distinguishes between the direct and indirect parts of the implementation of the Norms 
as defined here. TNCs, themselves, are both expected to internalise the culture of the 
Norms, as well as being subject to periodic monitoring and verifying by different 
bodies. Indirectly, the Norms are to be promoted through the amendments of the 
national legal frameworks by the States, to ensure that TNCs implement the Norms.75 
Backer claims that through the general provisions, the Norms exploit the flexibility of 
private law making to maximise the efficiency of implementation, without the 
interference of State actors.76  
Final Part I provides various definitions required for the interpretation of the 
document.77 Of particular importance is the definition of a TNC, which is quite broad 
and refers to an “economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of 
economic entities operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, 
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whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually 
or collectively.” The combination of this definition with the definition for “other 
business entities”, which was drawn up to “ensure that transnational corporations 
could not change their identity... and therefore avoid the draft Norms”, potentially 
includes nearly all business entities existent.78 The terms ‘human rights’ and 
‘international human rights’ are also defined widely for the purposes of this 
document. The terms include:  
“civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, as set forth in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and other human rights treaties, as 
well as the right to development and rights recognized by international 
humanitarian law, international refugee law, international labour law, 
and other relevant instruments adopted within the United Nations 
system.”79  
This definition allows the inclusion of human rights norms and standards from 
different levels and generations. While some of the norms listed in the document have 
universal legal effect, others are norms of positive character existent only between 
parties to certain agreements and some are even norms with no general legal effect 
and as such of nonbinding ‘soft law’ effect.80 
It seems that there exists a discrepancy between the major issues discussed 
while drafting the Norms and the issues which were the basis for the criticism of the 
Norms. There were five main issues that were widely discussed during the drafting 
process. The first issue was the scope of application of the Norms and the definition of 
the term TNCs. The decision of the drafters was to include all types of business 
entities, and not to limit the scope of the document just to TNCs. Weissbrodt 
emphasised that while most media attention focused on the misdeeds of major 
corporations, applying human rights standards only to large TNCs could be 
considered discriminatory. Moreover, the drafters considered it difficult to define 
appropriately the term TNC, so as not to allow corporate lawyers to restructure the 
framework of the corporation in a way that will prevent these standards to be applied 
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on this corporation.81 Secondly, and largely derived from the previous issue, the 
drafters of the Norms believed that the principles should be respected by all 
businesses, and in order to avoid distinctions between the standards applied to 
domestic and transnational corporations, applied the Norms to all corporations, while 
minimizing the implementation of rules for small “mom and pop” shops.82 Thirdly, 
the drafters of the Norms decided on an approach, according to which, the power and 
the influence of a corporation should be matched by the appropriate level of 
responsibility.83 Fourth, the Norms were designed to be the most comprehensive and 
human rights focused document applying transnational rules to businesses up to that 
time.84 Finally, a special non-voluntary character was designed for the Norms. While 
this did not amount to an “international treaty”, according to its drafters, they 
described the legal authority of the Norms as a “soft-law” restatement of the principles 
applicable to corporations, derived from their sources in international treaties and 
customary international law.85 Another novelty of the Norms was their use of a 
binding “shall” language, instead of the previously accepted “should” terms.86 
Out of the issues mentioned above, only the latter two were mentioned by the 
opponents of the Norms. The criticism of the Norms was focused more on the 
transition of responsibility from States to TNCs, through that altering the traditional 
framework of international law; the application of responsibility over the actions of 
other actors to TNCs; and the somewhat contradictory claims of over-legalism and 
vagueness of the document.  
The Norms relate to TNCs as entities with distinct social, cultural, civil and 
political rights and duties, rather than just legal entities whose function is limited to 
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the economic sphere only and whose activities must be regulated in order to remain 
active only in this sphere. Backer asserts that  Norms treat corporations as ‘virtual 
State actors’ for the purposes of many normative requirements.87 They bypass the 
medium of the State, in order to create a direct link between international law and 
TNCs, through that, making the TNCs important actors in promoting human rights, 
mainly in the developing countries, but also in the developed countries that refused to 
adopt certain human rights norms.88 
Several aspects of the Norms are worthy of a deeper analysis. The Norms drew 
from previous instruments of human rights the obligations relevant to TNCs and other 
business entities and applied them directly upon the corporations, while 
reemphasizing the primary and the overarching responsibility of the States.89 Kinley 
and Chambers identify four points where the Norms diverge from traditional human 
rights documents. Firstly, unlike other instruments of human rights law, the Norms 
revolved around the duty-bearers, upon which the different rules apply, rather than 
focusing on a single set of rights (civil, political, economic) or rights holders (women, 
children, racial groups).90 The focus of the Norms on duty-bearers, rather than on a 
specific set of rights, also causes them to be indeterminable about the exact scope of 
the specific rights, applicable to the TNCs.91  
Secondly, the notion of a “sphere of influence” and thus responsibility, derive 
from the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement. This aspect has also been 
criticised for not being clear enough and being ambiguous about the question of 
whether the entire supply chain of the corporation lies within its “sphere of activity 
and influence”.92  
Thirdly, the Norms seek to establish new enforcement mechanisms, applicable 
to non-State actors, and to make non-State actors the promoters of these norms and 
mechanisms when entering into contractual relationships with their business 
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partners.93 The subject of enforcement as such is a key issue of the Norms.94 TNCs 
were due to be subject to “periodic monitoring and verification by United Nations and 
other international and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created 
regarding the application of the Norms.”95 Vázquez further asserts that States would 
be reluctant to create and maintain institutions, established under the Norms, as this 
would limit their own sovereign powers.96 Furthermore, he suggests that legal norms 
are less likely to be observed by non-State actors in the absence of effective 
enforcement mechanisms carrying sanctions.97 Another downfall of this mechanism is 
its unintended anti-democratic character, which is due to the influence of NGOs on 
the drafting process.98 Yet another shortfall of this mechanism is its supposed lack of 
sanctions to be implemented in case of violations.99 However, this shortfall is only 
alleged, as in fact, there is a rigid sanctioning mechanism which obligates the TNCs to 
be in business only with TNCs that adhere to the Norms which provides in fact the 
necessary sanction. Another element of implementation is the duty of the TNCs to 
provide “prompt, effective and adequate reparations to those persons, entities and 
communities” that have been adversely affected by failure to comply with the 
Norms.100 
Fourthly, the Norms added to the traditional scope of human rights other rights 
associated with consumer protection, environmental rights and issues of corruption 
alongside traditional human rights and fundamental freedoms.101 Kinley and 
Chambers observe that this development is sensible as violations of these norms may 
bring violations of other, more basic human rights, such as the right to life,102 denying 
                                                           
93
 Kinley & Chambers at 452–453; Baxi at 18 
94
 Weissbrodt at 67; Backer at 384 
95
 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) UN ESCOR Art. 16; Campagna at 1247 
96
 His claim in fact matched the views of various States. See f.e. the Australian and Norwegian 
responses to the Norms that argues exactly that. Australian Permanent Mission to the UN; DECISION 
2004/116 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND RELATED BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/norway.pdf (last visited Jul 12, 2011) 
97
 Vazquez at 954–955 
98
 Backer also notes that the result of the enforcement mechanism of the Norms would be the increased 
power of other non-State actors (the NGOs), while trying to regulate and limit the power of TNCs. 
Backer at 384–388 
99
 Campagna at 1247; Deva at 518–519 
100
 See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) UN ESCOR Art. 15-16; Deva at 500 
101
 Kinley & Chambers at 453–455; Vazquez at 944–947; Baxi at 16–17; Deal 
102
 Which may be the result of serious violations of consumer protection. 
 22 
 
populations of economic, social and cultural rights103 and other basic widely accepted 
values such as the right to health and the right to development.104   
One of the advantages of the Norms was its possible impact, through the non-
voluntary instrument of regulation, to overcome a so called “free-rider” dilemma of 
many TNCs, whereas the adoption of voluntary programmes for the protection of 
human rights, would disadvantage them economically against their competitors in the 
market, who do not take similar actions.105 Backer also argues that one of the 
important aspects of the Norms was that it constituted “in fact of a mechanics of 
interplay between the national, international, public and private law in allocating and 
competing for regulatory power.” [italics in origin]106 
5 The Norms – an appraisal 
Backer analyses two main types of responses to the Norms. The ‘public sector 
oriented’ participants, which mainly refers to academics and NGOs, supported the 
document for being an advance over existing voluntary standards by providing a 
single comprehensive regime which draws an appropriate balance between the 
obligations of the States and of companies with respect to human rights. They claimed 
that the Norms provided a template for State behaviour along with a system of 
remedies for individuals supervised by a supra-national organisation. The second 
group, ‘private sector’ or ‘market oriented’ participants, emphasised the extreme 
radicalism of the Norms – the mandatory approach; the presumption that private 
economic entities are more, rather than less likely to promote human rights and 
development; and the lack of basis for obligating TNCs under international law, 
particularly in light of the vagueness and questionable legal effect of some of the 
norms mentioned in the document.107 The second group was the more influential one, 
and it was the one that eventually determined the future of the Norms. This section 
analyses the responses to the Norms through examining the validity and reasons for 
these responses. 
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We shall first turn to examining the responses by the business sector. Despite the fact 
that the majority of the business community rejected the Norms, mainly through the 
business chambers and industry organisations; some favoured the application of the 
Norms and even volunteered as pilot participants for the Norms. Parts of the business 
community, have claimed that compliance with human rights law should be by choice 
and only applicable to the extent desired by the business community. They also 
argued that nation States, rather than the UN, should enforce human rights.108 The 
International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organisation of Employers 
issued a joint statement opposing the Norms and their “legalistic approach”. At the 
same time the US Council for International Business opposed the Norms through 
criticising their vagueness. Senior Vice President, Deal, claimed that the Norms create 
a “legal no man’s land”.109 He argued that because the document does not distinguish 
between binding and non-binding human rights obligations, as some of its principles 
are drawn from non-binding instruments of human rights, it blurs the line between 
voluntary and legal actions, thus making “corporate compliance virtually 
impossible”.110 Kinley and Chambers argue, however, that a certain level of 
vagueness is not only expected from an international document (as opposed to 
domestic legislation), but is required in order to create consensus on the international 
level.111 
The duties of the TNCs were to increase not just directly, but indirectly as 
well. Not only might have the Norms placed a legal liability upon a corporation that 
colludes with a State which is a perpetrator of human rights violations, but they also 
stipulated as a duty for a TNC to ‘impose’ human rights obligations upon States, even 
if these States refused to ratify the human rights instruments involved.112 Backer 
claims that this reflects the use of mechanisms of ‘low level’ international 
governance, meaning international governance that arises “at the level of private law 
in the municipal systems of sovereign states”, which has been a contested issue in the 
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field of international relations.113 As Deva alleges, the Norms were too centred on the 
aspiration to stress the basic universality of human rights, while ignoring operational 
standards and realities of human rights protection and the regional and cultural 
differences present.114  
Perhaps, the best characterization of the approach adopted by the Norms was 
reflected in the eleventh paragraph of the Preamble:  
“Noting that transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
have the capacity to foster economic well-being, development, 
technological improvement and wealth as well as the capacity to cause 
harmful impacts on the human rights and lives of individuals through 
their core business practices and operations, including employment 
practices, environmental policies, relationships with suppliers and 
consumers, interactions with Governments and other activities”.115  
According to Kinley and Chambers, the second part of this paragraph and the 
extended responsibility of businesses for the activities of others, such as suppliers, 
partners, joint ventures and even governments, was one of the most problematic 
aspects of the Norms.116 The business community utilized the first part of the 
paragraph and their voluntary desire to self-regulate the limited cases where such 
violations were happening, to criticise the Norms. John Cridland, Deputy Director-
General of the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) was quoted to have said 
“[t]hat leaves business having to blow the whistle on something that aims to subject 
firms to criticism and liability for abusing human rights. It is quite wrong to suggest 
that firms are generally involved in widespread abuse of human rights - where is the 
evidence?”117  
Another major issue of concern for many corporations were the practical 
implications of the danger of reparations that the companies will be liable to, in 
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accordance with the Norms.118 This was particularly worrisome, because as mentioned 
above, they may be liable not only for the direct actions of the corporation itself, but 
for the ill-deeds their suppliers, joint ventures and other groups, including 
governments, from whose activities they benefited.119  
Campagna argues that the main reason for the general opposition of the 
business community against the Norms was not some perceived flaws in the text of 
the Norms, but rather a substantial flaw in the conceptual framework which business 
leaders apply to international human rights instruments. She alleges that businesses 
perceived IHRL as a sole management issue, while in her opinion, only the question 
of whether to comply with IHRL constituted a management issue, with the more 
essential question of human rights compliance resembled a legal issue which to decide 
should not be left to the discretion of businesses.120 The Norms therefore represent a 
major deviation from the more widely accepted approach of self-regulation which is 
the preferred approach when governing relations between business and human 
rights.121  
Backer regards the Norms as going even further in altering the foundations of 
corporate regulation, by actually transforming the authority in regard to regulating 
TNCs. The drastic change in the definition of stakeholders that is embedded into the 
Norms alters the foundations of corporate governance and regulation. The theory is 
that human rights under the Norms will enter municipal legal systems and 
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international law not from above as part of prescribed international treaty law, but 
rather from below by way of business relations, through private law which will then 
establish binding rules which in turn will become new customary international law.122 
The far-reaching character of the Norms drew significant opposition from 
various States as well. Most States expressed strong reservations emphasising the 
undesired departure from the traditional framework of international law, and stressing 
the central role of the State as an actor under international law.123 Backer further 
points out that many States indicated that they would be unwilling to accept any law 
regime which had the potential to threaten their monopoly of power to adopt and 
implement international norms within their territory.  
Developing States were concerned that the Norms favoured corporate 
authority over State control when implementing human rights standards in their 
respective state territory.124 Another concern was that the Norms could reduce 
incentives for some TNCs to expand their operations in some developing States, thus 
potentially harming the economic development of these States.125 In general, unlike 
Western States, which replied to OHCHR’s ‘Note Verbale’ regarding the 
Commission’s decision 2004/116 on the Norms,126 by emphasising their general 
disapproval of the document; the replies of developing States were much more scarce 
and apart from Cuba, did not relay to the issue of the Norms directly.127 Cuba as an 
exception supported the Norms as a ‘welcomed progressive development of 
international law’.128 
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Western States voiced concern that shifting responsibility for the implementation of 
human rights standards to corporations would dilute the primary responsibility of 
States as lawmakers.129 The United Kingdom argued for a framework containing “a 
universally accepted collation and clarification of the minimum standards of 
behaviour expected of companies with regard to human rights”.130 The Australian 
Government held “the firm view that legal responsibility for the implementation of 
international human rights standards rests primarily with those States who are party to 
the standards, not individual businesses. Businesses are obliged to comply with the 
laws of the countries in which they operate.”131 The Canadian Government recognised 
that “companies have an important role to play in the promotion and protection of 
human rights”, but emphasised the primary role of the States in this matter. They also 
expressed several concerns regarding the Norms, mainly that they purport to extend 
existing human rights obligations of States to TNCs; entrust enforcement 
mechanisms, which may become ineffective, to non-State actors, which in turn can 
assist States in avoiding their human rights obligations; and change the existing 
framework of obligations within the framework of international law.132 The United 
States went even further by claiming that the Norms were not based on existing legal 
frameworks, that they were “doomed from the outset” and that the international 
community should rather focus on assisting States to implement their human rights 
obligations and enforce national law.133 Moreover, they claimed that the Norms 
represented a significant divergence from the existing frameworks of international law 
by attempting to establish duties and obligations to non-State actors, while these are 
applicable solely to States.134  
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There was also some anxiety that the Norms would make the TNCs both a subject and 
a source of international law.135 Of particular interest was the response of the United 
States, which reiterated their position in the beginning of their response that the 
Norms “have no status – legal or otherwise. Not only was this exercise beyond the 
mandate of the Sub-Commission – but it was undertaken wholly without 
consideration for the views of the States.” The US also refuted the claim that TNCs 
are responsible for widespread human rights abuses in countries where they operate, 
and claimed that this is the result of “action or inaction of States”. The US further 
claimed that international community should focus on promoting and enforcing the 
rule of law by governments and not on “a drafting exercise geared toward creating 
‘norms’ out of whole cloth.”136 
These adverse views seriously impacted on the views of other UN Member 
States, when the Norms were discussed for adoption by the Commission at its 60th 
session in 2004: consequently the work on the norms was put on hold. Later, the 
OHCHR issued a statement thanking the Sub-Commission for drafting of the Norms 
confirming the overall importance of the subject, and at the same time, clarified that 
the draft proposal had no legal position, and therefore the Sub-Commission should not 
perform any monitoring functions regarding the Norms.137 Subsequently, the Norms 
were thus effectively abandoned by the Commission on Human Rights in its 61st 
session in 2005, in line with the approach led by the United States and Australia, 
whereas the Commission recommended that the UN General Secretary should appoint 
a Special Representative to review the whole matter of corporations and human 
rights.138 Consequently, in July 2005, Harvard Professor John Ruggie was appointed 
as the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General.139 
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In their present form, the Norms have no binding force in international law. The Sub-
Commission which drafted the Norms was not mandated (in a position) to create new 
international law. At present, there is no international treaty which incorporates the 
Norms, nor is there evidence of any evolving state practice indicating the development 
of customary international law to that effect. Moreover, as mentioned above, the 
Commission itself stated that the Norms should have no legally binding effect. 
However, restatements of any principles of customary international law that had been 
codified in the Norms retain their force.140  
6 Conclusion 
This article tried to discuss the question of why the Norms failed to win approval by 
the UN Commission on Human Rights. The paper suggests that the formal 
abandoning of the Norms was caused by a number of factors, which are the effects of 
the framework of the Norms, rather than their substance. These reasons were well 
represented in the reservations and criticism of States and the business community of 
the Norms. The main criticisms related to subjecting TNCs to direct obligations under 
international law without the express consent of the States; overstretching of existing 
human rights instruments by applying them directly on TNCs; the non-voluntary 
character of the Norms; disempowering the States and enlarging the legal role of 
corporations on their account; vagueness of the Norms; and the allegedly ineffective 
anti-democratic enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the reasons for the failure of the 
norms can be generally divided into three groups. Firstly, the novel character and the 
large scope of new legal concepts within the framework of the Norms broke with 
traditional roles conferred under international law, thus enabling States and businesses 
organizations to claim that the Norms were contrary to the positivist foundations of 
international law. Secondly, the scope of the Norms went too far in blurring the 
distinction between public and private law legal frameworks, therefore giving room to 
the argument that the new concepts countermanded the fundamental role of the State 
as legislator. Finally, the legal vagueness of the Norms and the discussed 
contradictions within the Norms helped to object to their eventual endorsement and 
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led to their eventual dismissal. Some of these crucial norms faults of the Norms 
should be further emphasised. A central issue was the planned degrading of States as 
the main subjects of international law, by curtailing their legislative sovereignty and 
authority. Vázquez observes that the Norms created a framework, which promoted a 
factual disempowerment of the States.141 TNCs and other non-state actors’ motivation 
to comply with the Norms may differ or even contradict to the interests of States: 
business operations may follow different rules than state interests. He also observes 
that such violations of international law may have a jurisgenerative effect, and 
therefore we should leave the norms which should still be developed away from any 
rigid enforcement mechanism and only use such mechanisms with clear norms that 
are not to be changed.142 
As mentioned, the Norms blurred the line between public and private law, and 
moved in the direction of transnational law, by elevating the role of TNCs to subjects 
of international law. In that they went further than other initiatives dealing with the 
relations of business and human rights. Backer believes that the Norms treated the 
TNCs as subjects of international law, rather than as objects, a significant change 
which alters the regulatory power from State to non-State actors.143 This character of 
the Norms was largely resisted by States. The UK submitted a document to the 
OHCHR stating that  
“[a]ny ongoing process should not seek to place companies in the same 
position as States with regard to obligations in international human 
rights law. To avoid confusion of their legal status, texts relating to the 
responsibilities of business with regard to human rights should not use 
legally-binding treaty language.“144  
Perhaps the main reason that the Norms were opposed so fiercely by a wide 
coalition was that they ‘touched the heart of the matter’. They questioned the very 
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essence of the State centred doctrine,145 through promoting direct legal obligations on 
TNCs and structuring a role for TNCs that bypasses the States and subjects them to 
supranational regulation monitored through non-State enforcement mechanism. The 
Norms were different from all other frameworks intended to deal with the issue, they 
weren’t just moderate adjustments of the inefficient system of State regulation of 
TNCs. They tried to use the international legal framework to establish the basis for 
private law making. This was an attempt to rejoin the public and private legal systems 
into a single framework of transnational law, similar to the frameworks that existed 
prior to the Peace of Westphalia. Such a significant alteration of the framework of 
international law would represent a crucial divergence of the exclusive, State 
monopolised international legal system to an inclusive transnational system with 
various legal subjects. This change was well understood by the (mainly Western) 
States, which was reflected in their extreme criticism of the project.  
One can  compare the introduction of the Norms into the ruling paradigm of 
voluntary initiatives that are maintaining the State centred order with an alternative, 
presented at the time, of what Kuhn relates to as “normal science”.146 This brings us to 
the wider question posed at the beginning of this paper, as to whether there is a 
possibility of installing ‘hard law’ in the framework of international law, to regulate 
the relations between business and human rights. If we adhere to Kuhn’s view, then 
the situation must become a crisis before there will be a destructive-constructive 
paradigm change. It seems that reality confirms to this assumption. One of the key 
objections to the Norms was due to it being more than the ‘soft law’ document that its 
drafters attempted to present at a certain point. Neither the business community, nor 
most of the States were ready to accept the creation of binding international law 
regulating corporations, which does not only bypass the States, but attempts to coerce 
them from below. This, however, may be the result of the joining of various (over-) 
ambitious intentions of the Norms, and may not necessarily predict the failure of all 
future ‘hard law’ initiatives. There are indications that the Norms went too far, but 
they may have suggested an alternative to a problem that may otherwise remain 
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unanswered. Perhaps, like Kuhn would predict, there needs to be a new ‘crisis’ – an 
extreme situation that clarifies the failure of the current voluntary and self-regulating 
frameworks, in order to move ahead to the new paradigm.  
One cannot avoid reassessing the value and the meaning of the Norms in light 
of the newly endorsed Guiding Principles and the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
framework in general. While at first it seems that the Norms were an important lesson 
for the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Business and Human 
Rights on the necessity of a document that is accepted by all stakeholders and does 
not propose a rigid binding framework; a deeper analysis of the Guiding Principles 
may suggest that the difference between the two documents is more nuanced and even 
this clear ‘soft law’ document may lead to a future development ‘hard law’ regulation, 
but as opposed to the Norms an accepted one.147 
The question of the failure of the Norms should therefore be limited to their 
formal scope. On the normative scope, the Norms may be (at least) a partial success. 
Despite the failure of not having become binding law, the Norms did generate a 
tangible impact on stakeholders at the non-State level. Investment institutions began 
applying the Norms to persuade companies to improve their social responsibility, 
NGOs began using the Norms as a basis for their advocacy of corporate social 
responsibility, companies have expressed general support for the Norms, while others 
even began “road-testing” the Norms.148 Perhaps after all, the Norms are fulfilling the 
role designed for them, even if they were not adopted officially. Being the less 
preferred alternative for the corporations, they have certainly turned out to be one of 
the fundamental building blocks of the new UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
framework. Rule suggests that the Norms were designed to stimulate societal change, 
rather than to become a binding legal document and that it should therefore be read as 
relating to an ideal structure of de lege ferenda as regards the connection between 
business and human rights.149 Backer argues that the Norms were constructed as to 
have a certain constitutional dimension on a supra-national level.150 One can conclude 
with the words of Baxi, whereas the more successful attempts to legislate were often 
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the ones were the original ambitions constituted legal utopias ‘de lege ferenda’, which 
managed to transform existing legal and factual frameworks altogether.151 
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